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Philosophy of Education and Education of Philosophy:
Three Styles of Teaching Philosophy




What follow is an attempt to isolate the specificity of the nature of teaching and learning
philosophy in which philosophy is seen as identical with or closely tied to a specific activity.
Because philosophers who embrace one of certain views tend to think that learning and
teaching this activity is a main aim of philosophical education, guidelines for teaching and
learning practice are already implied by their own conceptions. However, discussions of the
nature of the nature of the subject are conducted apart from debates about adequate teaching
methods. In this paper, I want to examine how different conceptions are related to teaching
philosophical practices, that is to say how methods of teaching philosophy can vary with these
different conceptions of philosophy.
Key words: philosophy, teaching & learning, science, history, art.
. IntroductionⅠ
It is a commonplace to say that opinions differ widely as to the nature of philosophy.
Not only do characterizations of philosophy vary, but they are also made from different
perspectives. One may, for instance, characterize philosophy as the quest for wisdom, or
the search for a view of reality as a whole. But if one does so, not much is being said
about the ways along which this wisdom or this view of reality can be acquired.
A. Three conceptions of the nature of philosophy
In this paper I will discuss three common conceptions of the nature of philosophy in
which philosophy is seen as identical with or closely tied to a specific activity. Because
philosophers who embrace one of these views will tend to think that learning this
specific activity is a main aim of philosophical education, guide lines for teaching and
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learning practice are already implied by these three conceptions. Usually, however,
discussions of the nature of the subject are conducted apart from debates about
adequate teaching methods. In this paper, I examine how three conceptions are related
to teaching practice, that is to say how methods of teaching preparatory philosophy can
vary with these conceptions of philosophy:
1. Philosophy as problem-oriented: according to this view, philosophizing is trying to
solve philosophical problems or find answers to philosophical questions. It remains
to be seen, of course, which types of problems count as philosophical.
2. Philosophy as history-oriented: according to this view, the main activity of the
philosopher is the interpretation and re-interpretation of the philosophical past as
expressed in philosophical texts. How the history of philosophy can be continued
in the future is not always clear in a history-oriented conception of philosophy,
because the activity of text-interpretation diverges radically from the way many
philosophers of the past understood theirownactivities. If we find it so difficult to
interpret past texts, we must necessarily find it even more difficult to predict how
future generations may interpret our own, and still more difficult to predict what
types of texts they may generate in turn.
3. Philosophy as person-oriented: this is the conception ofphilosophy as the attempt to
create a personal, rationally articulated view of the world as a whole.
I will not take the practices which are common today in the teaching of philosophy as
my guide; teaching practice often is much more restricted than it could be. I will try to
elucidate how much this practice could vary in principle and will concentrate on what
is feasible, not on what is usual. My purpose will have been reached when teachers
who do not share my view of philosophy get some useful hints out of this paper.
B. The aims of teaching philosophy.
The educational aims of teaching philosophy are only partly dependent on the nature of
the subject as conceived by professional philosophers working in a universities. It is not
superfluous to remind philosophers of the simple fact that the aims of any formal
education are partly determined by law, by governmental regulations, by financial
constraints, by the expectations of the parents and of society at large, by the motivation
of the students, and -last but not least- by the abilities of the teachers who happen to
be in the school. The conception of philosophy embraced by the teacher is only one
among the factors determining what will be done in the classroom.
As a result not so much of thedominant conception of philosophy, but of the dominant
teaching-models the academic style of teaching by lecturing and reading texts is much
more widespread in secondary school education than one would expect on the basis of
the wide variation in conceptions of philosophy adhered to. University teaching in
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philosophy is a strong and not always beneficial model for the teaching of philosophy
outside the university. As a result, the teaching of philosophy is much more
monotonous than it could be. A clarification of the relations between conceptions of
philosophy and teaching practice could be of some help to the teacher who wants to
face the consequences of his philosophical position.
There are a number of constraints on the practical consequences a conception of
philosophy can have in the classroom. In the first place, the consequences of the nature
of philosophy for teaching aims and practices are notequally clear for every conception.
This is an additional reason why the practice of philosophy in secondary schools is
much more uniform than could be expected.
In the second place, the teacher is not free to act as he or she likes. Apart from other
factors determining the aims of secondary education which I mentioned earlier, the
teacher has to consider the possibilities of the schedule, the size of the group, the
opportunities of the classroom and the expectations of the students, not only regarding
the nature of philosophy, but also regarding the nature and duration of the learning
process, etc. In the course of this paper, I will pay some attention to these factors and
see how they co-operate to bring about the dilution of any clear conception of
philosophy teaching and in the mixing of styles of teaching.
. Philosophy as Problem-OrientedⅡ
The conception of philosophy as problem-oriented is widely associated with an analytic
orientation in philosophy. Philosophy is seen as a set of more or less eternal problems,
subdivided into different areas or disciplines of philosophy. The philosopher is the one
who has learned to deal with the type of problems in this field, that is to say
philosophy is a kind of craft and the philosopher is a competent craftsman. There may
be parallels in dealing with problems in different areas of philosophy, but competence
in one area of philosophy does not automatically imply competence in another field.
The general model for teaching philosophy in a problem-oriented way is the teaching of
a technique. The main purpose of teaching philosophy, then, is the acquisition of a
philosophical skills. Skills are exercised on philosophical problems. The acquisition of
skills starts with simplified and isolated problems and proceeds to the ever more
complicated questions which are typical for the stage the subject has reached and
demand the application of integrated skills.
A. The nature of philosophical problems
According to the conception of philosophy as problem-oriented, philosophical problems
are seen as a particular type of problem resulting from a technical transformation of
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everyday questions. The nature of those problems and the particular transformation
which makes them into philosophical problems will not be discussed here.
This is not to deny that philosophical problems are in a way "eternal" problems.
However, even if a final solution of the problems regarded as philosophical is not
expected, the professional philosopher will try to find an answer which is satisfying for
the moment, or at least try to eliminate definitely wrong answers and to formulate the
reasons why a particular answer can not be given. The quest for an answer begins with
the formulation of the questions in a precise, technical vocabulary by which it is clearly
distinguished from related or seemingly related questions. This technical transformation
of the everyday question subsumes it under a definite category (problem-type), suggests
certain ways of trying to find an answer and sets standards for such an answer.
Adherents of this conception of philosophy will in general see an analogy with the
sciences: philosophy is one among many sciences, from which it distinguishes itself by
the nature of its problems. Just like the other sciences, philosophy is a professional
competence defined by mastery of a technical vocabulary, knowledge of accepted
answers, ability to recognize problems and skill in applying the methods of the trade to
those problems. As a consequence of the relation between problems, knowledge and
skills, philosophy is -just like the science again- subdivided into a numberofdisciplines,
each with their own specialists.
A scientistic conception of philosophy is easily associated with the analytic tradition in
philosophy. It is clear, that a number of the above mentioned paraphernalia are more
characteristic for the Anglo-saxon tradition in philosophy than for the so-called
Continental tradition. The view of philosophy as problem-oriented, or even the attempt
to put it on a scientific basis is not restricted to the analytic tradition, however. The
Neo-Kantian and phenomenological tradition, and even part of the hermeneutic
tradition, saw philosophical problems in the same light.
Nor is the conception of philosophy as problem-oriented automatically connected with a
scientific view. Even if one believes that solutions to philosophical problems are
possible, it remains a characteristic of philosophy that its problems and its answers
concern our view of reality as a whole, that as a consequence philosophy can never be
the exclusive domain of a restricted number of specialists and that a re-translation of
our answers into the language of everyday life remains necessary.
B. The analogy to laboratory work
In the emphasis on the skills of the philosopher in connection with specific knowledge,
there is an analogy with a craft. The philosopher is a craftsman who in a certain
isolation works on the solution of problems which have already been subjected to some
preparatory treatment by which they have been transformed into philosophical
problems.Onecanalsothinkofworkinthelaboratory,wheretherealsoexis tsastrong
connection between knowledge and skills. The problems of a specific craft are of a
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particular type and philosophy is no exception. And in accordance with the type of
problems acknowledged as philosophical and the expectations held about solutions or
answers, there exist authorized procedures to reach and establish those answers.
The craftsman or the scientist in the laboratory would subdivide his problems into
many small steps to be taken one by one. There may be times when he is not working
on the problem at all, but is designing new tools for the next step. The apprentice
learns the trade piecemeal. The master may explain part of the problem or demonstrate
the operation of a specific tool, and the apprentice may be set on a specific task as an
exercise, sometimes a task which has been devised for the trainee. Only after having
mastered the principal tools and having acquired some basic knowledge can the
apprentice be expected to enter upon a realistic problem and try to go through the
whole process ofproblem-transformation, examination of the problem-type, defining and
refining relevant concepts, collecting relevant knowledge, etc.
C. Progress in philosophy
If carried to the extreme the problem-oriented conception of philosophy could regard
the history of philosophy in the same way science sees its history: as a continual
evolution in which an ever growing body of knowledge and procedures is amassed. In
fact no conception of philosophy is as a-historic as this. Even in a analytic tradition
philosophy is seen as a collection of problems which in themselves are eternal and to
which no definite solution will ever be found. There is no ultimate philosophical truth.
Nevertheless the problem-oriented conception of philosophy admits a notion of progress
in philosophy in the sense thattheanswers given by the past and especially thereasons
adduced for them cannot be ignored. The argumentations of philosophers from the past
can even exclude certain answers; there may be no ultimate philosophic truth, but there
can be discovered ultimate philosophic falsehoods. To ignore the achievements of the
past is a sign of philosophical incompetence. From this follows a programme for
instruction in philosophy. To say it in the words of an eminent representative of the
analytic tradition:
It is precisely and only because it is in this and other ways possible to assess
philosophical expertise independently of any judgment of the truth or falsity of some
particular position that we are able to conduct non-partisan university examinations
which set questions in philosophy as opposed to questions asking only what some
philosopher as a matter of fact said.2)
Nevertheless the relation of philosophy to its history poses a problem for a
problem-oriented conception of philosophy. History is more than a simple stock of
answers and arguments, because the relation of technical expertise to everyday
questions remains vital and these questions cannot be understood out of the context of
everyday life. And everyday life changes in the course of history.
2) Antony Flew, An Introduction to Western Philosophy; Ideas and Argument from Plato to Sartre.
(London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), p.33.
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D. The aims of instruction in philosophy: Philosophic skills
What does it mean to learn philosophy according to a problem-oriented conception of
philosophy? Obviously it means the acquisition of (part of) philosophical competence or
expertise. This could be restricted to obtaining knowledge only. But as we have seen,
there is little definite knowledge in philosophy. Knowledge of the opinions of a number
of philosophers from the past or elsewhere is a poor substitute. And as soon as their
reasons for having those opinions are taken into consideration conceptual and
procedural knowledge is required to be able to understand and evaluate the
argumentations.
Translated into everyday language, this means that learning philosophy always to some
extent means learning to philosophize. How far this aim goes is dependent on the
exigences of the educational institute under consideration. But even to be able to
understand the problems of philosophy and some proposed answers it will be necessary
for the student to acquire some philosophical skills.
The skills necessary in philosophy are often understood as general intellectual skills
which can in principle be applied to a broad area of subjects. They comprise skills like
conceptual analysis, argumentation, interpretation, evaluation of presuppositions,
problem solving skills, etc. Skills like these -such is the assumption- can be learned in
one area of thought and successively applied in another areas.
For teaching philosophy this means that an analysis of the expertise in a certain area of
philosophy is a prerequisite for a structuring of the learning conditions in that area.
Such an analysis is unusual. Conventional description of the structure of the disciplines
of philosophy and of philosophical expertise are unfit for the purpose.
E. Teaching philosophy in a problem-oriented way
Teaching philosophy in a problem-oriented way will show a number of characteristics:
1. Attention will be paid to the acquisition of skills. Skills have to be explained and
demonstrated. The aim will be proceduralisation, that is to say automatically
"knowing one's way around" in the discipline.
2. To this end, complex skills have to be subdivided into a number of steps for which
separate exercises are necessary.Theteacherwill spend a lot of preparation time on
the design of useful exercises and activities.
3. Lecturing will only be used to provide the knowledge necessary for the use and
application of concepts, recognition of problems and problem types, demonstration
of specific types of argumentations, etc.
4. The role of the teacher will be central, not only because he delivers and structures
the instruction, but also because he controls and judges achievements.
5. The philosophical disciplines will be taught separately.
6. History of philosophy is relevant only to provide some insight into the relationship
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between the 'eternal' questions of philosophy and the transformations of those
questions. For the teacher history can be a source of simplified problems and
implementations which can be used in exercises.
F. Drawbacks of the problem-oriented conception
Teaching philosophy in a problem-oriented way can at times be academic in the bad
sense of the word and even boring. No inspiring lectures in grand style here, no great
visions, no pondering over the riddle of existence, but painstaking analysis and patient
exercise. Between the quest for wisdom, which could well form part of the motivation
of the students, and the rigid school discipline to which they are subjected in the
classroom lie oceans. For just this reason there has been a massive flight from analytic
philosophy in recent years. Intellectual modesty is not always attractive.
Another problem is the history of philosophy. Some knowledge of the philosophical
past was always considered part of the intellectual outfit of the educated man (and
woman). Even if this means no more than being able to join the conversation at a
birthday party a strong expectation like this cannot be completely neglected.
. Philosophy as History-OrientedⅢ
Although different conceptions of the history of philosophy exist, many philosophers
would agree that the historical nature of philosophical problems is somehow essential to
philosophy. Some would even say, that the nature of philosophical problems changes
with historical periods and that the only constant in the history of philosophy is the
continuity of philosophical discourse. In this respect there is a difference in kind
between philosophy and the sciences; teaching philosophy is more like teaching
literature than like teaching science. Learning philosophy is learning to appreciate
philosophical works as an expression of their time. Following this conception of
philosophy, it would be natural to concentrate on the reading of important
philosophical works from the past, to explain these by embedding them in the general
culture of their time and to show, how they influenced our time.
A. The historical character of philosophical problems
In a problem-oriented conception of philosophy, it is not denied that philosophical
problems originate in the history of philosophy and are shaped by temporal
circumstances as well as by the tradition of the craft. The historical character of the
problems is not, however, stressed. The professional philosopher may feel free to
neglect whole periods of the history of philosophy and to ignore the chronology of
problem-development. In fact the complete history of philosophy can be rewritten as a
systematic account of the achievements which we have at our disposal. In fact some
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introduction to philosophy -not always the most inspiring ones- do just that.
The history-oriented conception of philosophy, however, gives priority to the historical
development of philosophical problems. Philosophy is shaped by its past, but also by
the specific cultural, social and political circumstances of its time. Even the degree to
which these factors influence philosophy may vary. It is not even certain that problems
are at the core of philosophy; this may sometimes be the case, but other periods may
stress 'visions' or the defence of cherished creeds.
Carried to the extreme, this conception means there may be very little relationship
between the philosophy of a given historical era and the preceding one. Although the
philosophical past is the one of the determining factors, it is the past as conceived by
the present in the perspective of its own conception of the nature of philosophy and its
own formulation of philosophical problems. There are thus no "eternal problems" in the
history of philosophy which are being transformed by each period in its own way.
Terminological continuity suggests a continuity of content which does not exist. An
"eternal" problem like that of free will for instance, when analysed properly in its
historical context, will be seen to have such different connotations in different periods
as to be a completely different problems. Some periods may even not see the problems
at all, although they have a vision on the matter.
Not everybody will go so far. But even in a more moderate historical conception doubts
exist as to whether philosophy can be separated from its history. So the natural subject
matter for philosophy as a school subject is the history of philosophy.
B. The analogy between philosophy and literature
Central in a history-oriented conception of the nature of philosophy stand the yexts, the
great philosophical works of the past. After all, there is not much else left. It is a
curious coincidence that the significance of the past is evidently enhanced by its radical
divergence from the present. The more radically historicist our conception of the past,
the less clear it is why we should be interested in it at all. This paradox of historical
knowledge, to which Nietzsche drew attention in his second Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung,
is an uneasy one: why should we pay any attention to the past if our preoccupations
are determined by the present?
The dominant activity in a history-oriented conception of philosophy is the
interpretation of philosophical texts. There is a strong parallel with history of literature
here. Systematic procedures for the interpretation of philosophical texts are often
strongly influenced by or even directly derived from the study of literature. The focus
of a particular interpretation shifts according to the general conception of literature
adopted. Existing texts and traditions, the biography of the author in question, the
conditions of academic life, the political situation of the moment, sociological conditions,
progress in the sciences and trends in literature and art all compete in providing tools
for the interpretation of a particular philosophical text. Whatever the focus of a
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particular method of interpretation, the role of extra-philosophical factors in the
interpretation of the work tends to be cardinal or even overwhelming.
Another paradox of a history-oriented conception of philosophy is the fact that themore
extra-philosophical factors come into the foreground, the more interest tends to be
restricted to a few great philosophers of the past, the "Ahnengalerie" of philosophy.
They seem the greater the less clear it is wherein exactly they were great. The more
dwarfish statures are reserved for the Ph.D. theses of not over-ambitious graduates.
Of course there can be no question of philosophic truth in a history-oriented conception
of philosophy; even the notion of truth is meaningless out of its historical context. This
does not mean that a work of philosophy cannot be judged. It can be more or less
significant, typical, influential, inspiring, etc. Even the answer to the questions it poses
can be more or less adequate. But there are no trans-historical standards for this
judgment. Standards shift between those of our time and those of the time from which
the work dates.
C. Philosophy in the continual conversation of mankind
If we deny constancy to the problems and methods of philosophy and instead recognize
only historical continuity, then we get a conception of the history of philosophy for
which R.Rorty has coined the phrase "the conversation of mankind":
The fact that we can continue the conversation Plato began without discussing the
topics Plato wanted discussed, illustrates the difference between treating philosophy as
a voice in a conversation and treating it as a subject, a Fach, a field of professional
inquiry. The conversation Plato began has been enlarged by more voices than Plato
would have dreamed possible, and thus by topics he knew nothing of.3)
Although one can drop in and join an existing conversation, understanding the
conversation as a whole can only result from beginning with the start of the
conversation and follow its course up to the present. If philosophy is no subject, it has
no history, at least not in the sense that physics has a history -as Rorty stresses on the
same page. A precondition for a history as the gradual development of the factors
which shaped a field of professional inquiry presupposes an identity of the subject. The
history of philosophy can only be told and retold.
Of course not all history-oriented conceptions of philosophy are as radical as this. A
conception which tries to unite the merits of a problem-oriented and a history-oriented
conception of philosophy is what German is called Problemgeschichte: understanding
philosophical problems means tracing their history. Problemgeschichte as it was written
by, for instance, Wilhelm Windelband in his famous Lehrbuch der Geschichte der
Philosophie presupposes a parallel between the logical development of a problem and
its historical awakening. Knowledge of the history is not only a convenient tool for the
acquisition of philosophical craftsmanship, but a necessary condition, because the
3) Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton 1979, p. 391
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historical nature of philosophical problems belongs somehow to their essence. Studying
the history of philosophy is the key to the ability to join in a topical discussion.
D. The aims of teaching philosophy: Interpretation
There is a nice symmetry between educational aims and teaching practice in the
history-oriented approach to philosophy: the ability to interpret historical texts is
acquired by constantly practising just that. Knowledge of the facts of the history of
philosophy will mostly be seen as subordinated to the ability to interpret them in a
history-oriented conception of philosophy. Furthermore it is clear that knowledge of the
past can not remain restricted to intimacy with the history of philosophy only, if the
situationally determined character of philosophy is taken seriously.
Text-interpretation will have a further aim: stimulating the appreciation of the great
works of philosophy. Also in this respect there is a parallel with teaching literature. The
object is never knowledge and skill as such, but skill in order to be able to appreciate.
E. Teaching philosophy in a history-oriented way
Teaching philosophy in a history-oriented way will clearly comprise two types of
practice: providing the general background and interpreting texts. It is difficult to see
how the necessary knowledge of an outline of the history of philosophy could be
acquired otherwise than by means of the lecturing method supported by a textbook.
What the teacher chiefly needs are the virtues of a good narrator. The same can be said
of a textbook and can be summarized as a negative quality: teacher and textbook
should not be boring.
There are a number of frameworks for the interpretation of philosophical texts.
Whichever plan is followed, the student will always be heavily dependent on the
teacher and the annotations in a text-collection. The relevant background for the
understanding of the text derives from a number of different areas and it is simply
impossible first to master the political, social, intellectual and artistic history of the
period before one can make a start at understanding and interpreting a text.
Consequently the role of the teacher is even more central than is the case in the
problem-oriented conception of philosophy and a larger part of student-time is
consumed in taking notes.
The history-oriented teaching of philosophy automatically goes beyond the borders of
philosophy proper. It provides therefore unique possibilities of cooperation between
different school-subjects, for instance in the form of project learning.
F. Drawbacks of the history-oriented conception
Teaching the history of philosophy can begin either way: with a survey of the history
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of philosophy, or with the interpretation of a particular text. Each practice has its
drawbacks. Starting with the survey means lecturing and all educational tricks will be
necessary to prevent boredom. The re-organizing of the historical materials is generally
more instructive for the teacher than for the student. Nevertheless, the students may be
thankful: historical surveys are in demand. If one starts with the reading and
interpretation of a particular text, the necessary background tends to fall apart in an
un-organized mass of facts. Probably the best way probably is to work in parallel
sessions; in one a historical survey would be given, while in the other a text or
text-collection from the relevant period would be read.
Text-interpretation presents its own difficulties. The activity presents itself as a whole
and can not be easily divided into steps. Nor is there an easy beginning. Beginning to
learn does not necessarily mean beginning with a simple philosophical work and a
simple text is not necessarily one from the beginning of history. Text-interpretation in
the classroom assumes the form of all kinds of disparate information, linguistic,
structural, historical, philosophical, etc. All these fields of knowledge are seemingly
without internal connection and it is not even clear to the student which kind of
information is relevant at a particular moment; nevertheless they cannot be separated.
Another problem is, that text-interpretation can -like argumentation or problem solving-
easilybemisconstrued as a general intellectual, subject-independent skill. Wehave seen,
however, that the interpretation of a particular text is only possible on the basis of
extensive knowledge the limits of which are not even clearly defined. No quick transfer
to the interpretation of other texts may be expected. Without the relevant knowledge it
is not even possible to understand why a particular text is of any importance, what it
is about, or even why it is a philosophical text (if we assume that the meaning of
"philosophy" changes through the ages).
G. The problem of teaching history
Text-interpretation as the main activity of philosophy may be seen as an attempt to
connect the trade of the philosopher to a definite skill or set of skills in correspondence
with a particular model of professional expertise and a model of school-education.
Professional skills which can be taught should be tied to specific activities which can be
subdivided, they should be reproducible and meet objective standards, and they should
be testable in a uniform way.
We have seen, however, that the essence of history if taken as a defining characteristic
of philosophy is the story. The problem is not simply one of the conception of
philosophy adopted. There is no place for story-telling in the model of school-education
which is generally, but unconsciously adopted. A rehabilitation of the story in education
would thus involve a re-orientation of the whole school-system. And this is not enough:
teachers are not prepared to tell stories, which demands quite another set of abilities
than instruction. Clearly that is the reason why lectures can be so boring and at the
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same time superfluous when measured by the standards of instruction.
Stories clearly have an important function in education. It is very difficult, however, to
indicate what exactly the function of stories is and in which sense they even could have
explanatory value. I will not try to give a philosophy of narrative thinking here.
. Philosophy as Person-OrientedⅣ
A third conception of philosophy is to regard it as the way in which an individual,
making use of ideas of his contemporaries and of the past, deals with life and reality in
a more or less coherent way. In this sense an individual can be said to develop his or
her own philosophy and the word "philosophy" can be used in the plural. Different
philosophies would be incomparable and although the past can be highly important for
individuals, the chronological development of philosophical ideas is not. As individual
thinkers borrow from and react to related minds, a typology of philosophies is more
relevant to an understanding of the nature of the subject than a survey of history.
The aim of teaching philosophy from a person-oriented perspective would be to enable
students to build their own philosophy. Thus there is an analogy between teaching
philosophy and teaching art. In the philosophy classroom, students wouldwork on their
own creation, either fulfilling tasks assigned to them by the teacher or setting their own
objectives. The teacher would function as an adviser, whose empathy and broad
knowledge of techniques and styles in philosophy would enable him to help each
student in reaching her or his personal aims. The activity of the student would thus be
more central than in the other two conceptions of philosophy.
A. Philosophical problems as the perplexities of an individual
If philosophy is seen as the way an individual copes with the problems of life, then
there are no fixed problems in philosophy. What is a problem for one individual is
completely unproblematic for another. The best one can say is, that certain themes recur
regularly in the history of philosophy, that there are related philosophies and related
problems.
Even the notion of problem changes. Philosophical problems are existential problems
and therefore to a certain degree beyond the reach of language. The formulation of a
problem is in this sense misleading; an individual answer to the problem can be
completely unsatisfying for another individual because the formulation of the problem,
and also answer, is only the tip of the iceberg.
The consequence of this conception is that there can exist no general standards by
which philosophical theories, systems and ideas can be judged. This does not mean that
professional competence plays no role at all, but that standards of better and worse are
relevant only within a certain type of philosophy. From a different perspective they
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may be completely irrelevant or even obnoxious.
Within a specific type of philosophy reasoning or argumentation can be relevant (the
measure of importance is alsodependent on the type of philosophy). Argumentation, or
vision, can be the gist of philosophy, just like drawing, or colouring, can beregarded as
the essence of art.
B. The analogy to artistic creation
The comparison between the person-oriented conception of philosophy and artistic
creation is not fortuitous. In each case the central activity is the creation of a personal
style or view ("Weltanschauung"). The professional philosopher is the one who does this
in a grand style, inspiring for many other people who simply borrow his ideas or make
variations on them. There is a radical divergence between philosophy and its history;
the historian of philosophy stands to the philosopher as the historian of art to the artist.
History of philosophy is a part of the trade of history. For the real philosopher it is no
more than a reservoir of ideas. Being faithful to what the ideas of the philosophers of
the past really meant is of concern to the historian, but irrelevant for the creator.
In fact the relation between the creator and the great philosophers of the past is the
same as that between the master and the student. Style and vision ofagreatmastercan
be inspiring and besides many different details of his craft can be learned by careful
study of his works, but only on the basis of an already existing common view. Martin
Buber could learn very little from Frege, just as Turner could not learn much from
Hans Holbein.
Criticism of particular philosophers, ideas, opinions, conclusions and solutions are all
subordinate to understanding the work of others as an expression of a particular
perspective. Creative activity is in the foreground. No arguments need to be adduced
for past preferences. One can specialize in being very self-willed. Whole provinces of
the philosophic past and whole areas of philosophical problems may be ignored with
impunity.
In the problem-oriented conception of philosophy specialization can be sensible or even
unavoidable, but it will usually follow the accepted divisions of the subject-area.
According to the history-oriented conception specialization will be less meaningful,
because the unit one studies will be a text, a period or a particular philosopher and
they will often not respect the nowadays accepted boundaries of the disciplines. In the
person-oriented conception one may specialize freely, not in the sense of knowing even
more about an ever smaller area around which knowledge spreads and thins in
hierarchial circles, but in the sense of being completely free in the choice of problems,
models and relations. The object of professional activity is not truth in a limited area,
but personal vision or style of experiencing in the world with others.
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C. The history of philosophy as reservoir of styles
As we have seen, the history of philosophy is not unimportant in the person-oriented
conception of philosophy. History, however, is not important as the repository of eternal
problems, as the logical prehistory of our own situation, or as illumination of the
radically different, but as reservoir of opinions, views, and techniques. We can
summarize this as saying that history is the embodiment of different styles of
philosophizing, styles which may originally have been tied to a particular historical
period or phase of development, but which may have lost all concrete historical ties.
History may have begun as a succession of style-periods but in the course of the
centuries these have developed into streams running beside each other. Chronology may
have lost all meaning, like in Chinese landscape-painting, where one can choose to
work in Sung-style nowadays and where the difference between original and fake has
lost significance.
For an artist the place to find history in this sense is the museum, not the
historiography of art, which can be no more than a superficial guide to the museum.
The philosophical museum is the library where the great works of the past are kept. As
in the history-oriented conception text has central importance, but in a very different
way. No historical of textual interpretation here. Historical circumstances and conditions
have no, or only limited significance. The greatest works have lost any clear historical
ties and are of all ages.
D. The aims of instruction in philosophy: Development of style
When teaching the history of philosophy the above-mentioned conception of the history
of philosophy may never be fully absent. In fact the parallel with artistic creation may
be one of the main reasons for the exceptional attention the great thinkers get in the
history of philosophy. But the obvious conclusions from this view are seldom drawn.
Just as the great art of the past is reduced to art-history as a subject the history of the
great philosophers is just told as the history of philosophy.
The point of a person-oriented conception of philosophy is, however, that the history of
philosophy is subordinate to the development of an individual style and technique, and
the knowledge of this history should not be present in the mind of the student as a
collection of relatively meaningless facts, but in the teacher as a palette of possibilities.
Knowledge of the past, that is knowledge of styles, techniques, solutions, etc., has
meaning in sofar as it enables the teacher to choose the right advice for the student at
a particular moment.
E. Teaching philosophy in a person-oriented way
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No clear alternative to the dominantteaching practices presents itself in connection with
the history-oriented conception of philosophy. A person-oriented conception, however,
opens the door for a teaching practice very far removed from usual practice. The
obvious analogy here is the workshop. Just as students of art work at their own
painting or sculpture under supervision of the teacher, students of philosophy could
work on their own problems, visions, conceptions, phantasies, speculations, etc. The
teacher would not be an instructor,butasupervisor .Hewouldread the draft, comment
on them, refer the student to works of philosophy which could be of help, and would
only occasionally give instruction when he perceives a recurrent problems.
The teacher would have no general method or styles of teaching. Each student has his
or her own problems, preferences and styles, and there will be no general recipe for all
cases. Apart from wide knowledge of techniques and styles the teacher requires
empathy. Being able to listen will be a quality at least as important as being able to
talk.
F. Drawbacks of the person-oriented conception
Problems with the person-oriented approach to philosophy have to do with the
circumstances under which teaching based on it would be possible. The teacher has to
pay time and attention to each individual student and therefore it is difficult to see how
teaching would be possible in large groups. Room and material means have to be
available too, especially a good library. The teacher has to be empathetic, but at the
same time he or she should have a profound knowledge of the trade and of different
styles of philosophy. These are demands which are difficult to meet and they are
certainly not always stimulated by university studies in philosophy or by teacher
training.
From the student a high degree of motivation is required. In the problem-oriented
conception the regular discipline of tasks set by the teacher guarantees that at least
something will be learned, even if the student is not highly interested in the subject.
Possibly the student discovers only afterwards that he or she learned something quite
sensible. In the history-oriented conception the problem of motivation is left with the
teacher: he should inspire the students, and lack of motivation can safelyberegarded as
failure of the teacher. But in the person-oriented conception there has to be some
motivation at the beginning, otherwise nothing will be learned. Because student activity
here is at the heart of teaching practice,, the problem of motivation cannot ultimately be
solved by the teacher, although he or she may seek to persuade the student. This is one
reason that a rather strict selection of candidates is a generally accepted in art-studies
-even though the criteria of acceptance are in constant debate.
. Choice or Combination of Styles of Teaching?Ⅴ
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I have made several remarks from which one could draw the conclusion that it would
be unwise in teaching philosophy to stick to merely one conception to the exclusion of
others. This may be true, but the difficulties in combining more than one style of
teaching should not be underrated.
In the first place my account should made clear, that for all three conceptions to be
valid that there must be a long way to go for the student. The learning difficulties of
the first conception are frequently underrated, because the teacher usually forms no
concrete and complete representation of teaching aims and methods. This is not only
due to choosing the wrong path in teaching,butalsotoheavilyunderrating the amount
of time necessary to master certain skills. If a careful analysis of learning steps is
neglected, not much more than vague reproductive abilities will result.
In philosophical education according to the history-oriented conception the difficulty we
have already stressed is the enormous amount of historical knowledge necessary to be
able to interpret a philosophical text, added to the unpredictability of the pieces of the
knowledge one will actually need in a concrete case. In teaching according to the
person-oriented conception it is clear from the start that the acquisition of an individual
style is the result of a long development. Interest and preferences change over a long
time and the integration of knowledge, personal interests, techniques, and creative ideas
into one view is time-consuming.
Up to a certain point, however, the combinations of styles is not only desirable, but
unavoidable. Even if the teacher himself has strong preferences, demands put on
teaching by the subject, by the school, by the expectations of the students cannot be
ignored. Nobody denies the claim to competence which is embodied in the first
conception and even the most historically minded teacher will concede that precise
formulation of a problem, analysis of the relevant concepts and careful reflection about
the kind of answer one expects are part and parcel of the philosophical craftsmanship.
On the other hand, not even the most hard-headed analytician denies the relevance of
history of philosophy. But even if history were irrelevant for the philosophical problems
as such, attention to the history of philosophy would be unavoidable, because it so
clearly belongs to the general intellectual stock-in-trade of the well-educated human
being. Not even the cultural supplement of the daily newspaper can be read without
some knowledge of the history of philosophy.
The third conception stresses what can be important for the student as an individual
and is as such expected by many students of philosophy. A philosophical education
which presents only impersonal knowledge or stresses only general skills will be a
deception for those students. Most important in philosophy -and this is a real difference
with science education- is the feeling of the student that philosophy is somehow
important for the conduct of life.
. Concluding RemarksⅥ
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It was to be expected, of course, that the aims of teaching philosophy would vary with
different conceptions of the nature of the subject, although it is also important to realize
that teaching aims are not exclusively determined by the subject or by the teacher. It
was the aim of my paper, however, to show how strongly teaching styles would differ
according to these conceptions. Having a different conception of the nature of
philosophy means more than just telling different stories in our lectures or reading
different texts with our students. Under some circumstances it might mean a completely
different atmosphere in the classroom, affecting activities and roles for student and
teacher alike. In one ideal classroom the students would be quietly at work while
teacher gives them their assignments, in another one the teacher would give a lively
performance in which the students are be absorbed, and in another case again there
might be busy talking and exchange of ideas.
It will also be noted that all three conception put heavy, though diverse, demands on
the teacher which are not easily met by teacher training. Teaching philosophy in a
problem-oriented manner requires the ability to make an analysis of philosophical
concepts, theories and problems from an instructional angle. This results in a
subdivision which is completely at variance with the kind ofanalysis one would find in
a textbook of philosophy. For the history-oriented way of teaching the teacher should
have a wide range of rhetorical and even theatrical abilities at his disposal which many
people think cannot be learned by training at all. And the third conception demand
from the teacher that he is a master of the art himself, but at the same time sympathetic
towards the sometimes completely different style conceptions of his students and
capable of guiding them by means of his wide knowledge. Being a teacher of
philosophy is no light task.
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